The paper analyzes the main characteristics and major changes in manufacturing industry in the old EU member states over the past twenty years, in order to draw some lessons for the Southeast European economies in transition, often referred to as the Western Balkans (WBs) -Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. During the last twenty years the more developed EU member states have experienced substantial changes in the structure of their economies, with services becoming the prevalent sector in terms of the most important indicators. Nevertheless, there is great heterogeneity within the EU regarding the contribution of manufacturing to employment and value added. The global financial and economic crisis from late 2008 onwards has revived the debate about the role of industry, its importance for economic growth and for international competitiveness. In this context, there has also been a renewed interest in industrial policy and reindustrialization. The ongoing analysis of trends in the EU could be extremely relevant for the WB countries, since these countries have gone through a process of strong deindustrialization. Given that their level of economic development is still low, manufacturing industry remains indispensable for future economic growth. The EU experience could offer useful guidelines for formulating future policies in this area.
Introduction 1
The paper analyzes the main characteristics of manufacturing industry in the European Union (EU) member states, with the aim of drawing some main lessons for the Southeast European economies in transition -Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia, frequently referred to as the Western Balkans (WBs). Croatia was the first from this group of countries to join the EU, on 1 July 2013, when it became the 28th EU member state. The other countries are also aspiring to become EU members over the coming years, so the experience in industrial development of the more developed EU countries could prove useful.
The global financial and economic crisis has had a profound impact on most European economies from late 2008 onwards. The economic crisis has proved to last much longer than was initially expected, while the sovereign debt crisis in the eurozone has in the meantime added further worries to an already troubled European Economic and Monetary Union. The unexpected prolongation of the recession in a number of EU countries and the uncertain prospects of permanent economic recovery have also brought very different proposals of economists worldwide regarding the right recipes. These developments have revived the debate Mirella Damiani and Milica Uvalic Industrial Development in the EU: What Lessons for the Future Member States? Croatian Economic Survey : Vol. 16 : No. 1 : April 2014 : pp. 5-48 number of industry-supporting services, such as product design, marketing, ICT supporting activities or assembling, that are important inputs for manufacturing production. At the same time, manufacturing has a carrier function for services, since services generally have limited tradability (European Commission, 2013: 10).
Despite the broad patterns of structural change towards a decline in the role of manufacturing industry, there is great heterogeneity within the EU, even among the old EU member states, regarding the contribution of manufacturing to employment and value added and the most competitive sectors. We will present the main features and changes that have taken place in manufacturing industry over the past two decades in the old EU member states, but occasionally also in the US as their main competitor. 
Trends in Manufacturing Employment and Value Added
The share of manufacturing employment has declined substantially from the 1970s until the early 2000s, as widely documented by Pilat et al. (2006) for all OECD countries. This decline has also been recorded throughout the [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] period in both the 3 and the US, although there are notable differences between the two regions. In the US, the share in manufacturing employment went down from 15 percent in 1990 to a low 10 percent of total employment in 2007, whereas in the EU-13 it declined from over 20 percent in 1990 to 15 percent in 2007 (OECD, 2014a . EU countries in 2007, therefore, had a share of manufacturing employment corresponding to the level that the US had seventeen years earlier (in 1990) .
However, within the EU, there are important cross-country differences. Among the economies with the highest drop in manufacturing employment one finds
Mirella Damiani and Milica Uvalic
Industrial Development in the EU: What Lessons for the Future Member States? Croatian Economic Survey : Vol. 16 : No. 1 : April 2014 : pp. 5-48 Germany, where the share of manufacturing employment fell by approximately 9 percentage points, from 28.3 percent in 1990 28.3 percent in to 19.0 percent in 2007 28.3 percent in (OECD, 2014a . Despite this decline, in 2007 Germany still had the second highest share in manufacturing employment after Italy (20.1 percent), whereas the US was the country with the lowest share (9.9 percent). Over the 1990-2007 period,
Germany was the country that had the most remarkable decline in the share of manufacturing employment (9 percentage points), while Finland the least (less than 3 percentage points) (see Figure 1 ). In most countries, the underlying cause of the decline of manufacturing employment shares was not only the increase of employment in services, but also the loss in absolute values of employees working in manufacturing; the only exception is Spain, which actually increased the number of employees by 15 percent during the 1991-2007 period. 4 The UK is the country that accounts for the largest percentage drop in the absolute value of employees in manufacturing (-33.3 percent) between 1991 (-33.3 percent) between and 2007 (-33.3 percent) between (OECD, 2014a .
Looking further into manufacturing employment from 1990 onwards, we can again note huge and persistent differences between the EU-13 and the US (see Figure 2 ). Among the EU countries, Germany registered a very steep decline in manufacturing employment in the early 1990s after the reunification of the country, but other countries -including Italy, the UK and France -also experienced similar, though less marked changes. 9   11   13   15   17   19   21   23   25   27   29   1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007 France Germany Italy UK EU-13 US
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Source: Authors' elaboration based on OECD (2014a).
Recent patterns in manufacturing employment also reflect significant shifts of production. If we consider the other key indicator, the contribution of manufacturing to value added available for more countries in the OECD database (OECD, 2014a) , all data confirm previous findings concerning the declining role of manufacturing. From 1990 to 2007, the largest fall in the share Industrial Development in the EU: What Lessons for the Future Member States? Croatian Economic Survey : Vol. 16 : No. 1 : April 2014 : pp. 5-48 of manufacturing value added occurred in Luxembourg (from over 20 to around 9 percent) and the UK (from over 22 to around 12 percent), while the lowest was recorded in Sweden where the decline was minimal (from 20.4 to 20.0 percent).
Over the same period, Germany registered a decline of approximately five percentage points, lower than that observed in its employment manufacturing share, but in 2007 the share of manufacturing value added was still as high as 23.6 percent, the highest among EU-15. These different patterns of employment and value added observed in Germany clearly reflect the modification of industrial relations of the mid-1990s and various labor market reforms (Carlin, 2012; Bonatti and Fracasso, 2013) .
Despite these changes, in 2007 Germany still occupied a leading position among the EU economies with its manufacturing sector representing almost 25 percent of its total value added. An important driving force of Germany's performance is its high R&D expenditure, the highest among the most important EU economies (see Figure 3 ). 1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010   Finland  France  Germany  Italy Portugal Spain UK
In log values (based on 2005 US dollars -constant prices and PPPs)
Source: Authors' elaboration based on OECD(2014a). Along with R&D, another possible cause of the efficiency gap among EU countries as well as the EU and its major global partners is the excessive regulation of product markets. The limited degree of competition does not assure adequate incentives for individual firms to adopt the best strategies. This is because product market competition is a key factor influencing aggregate performance indicators such as productivity (Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2003) . Furthermore, as
shown by the comparative analysis of Bartelsman, Haltiwanger and Scarpetta (2013) that covers five developed economies and three transition economies from Eastern Europe, excessive regulation can cause distortions due to misallocation of resources. The experience of the centrally-planned economies suggests that in countries characterised by widespread market-and policy-induced distortions, the largest businesses are not necessarily the most productive ones, but rather those that receive preferential treatment (Bartelsman, Haltiwanger and Scarpetta, 2013 ).
If we now consider the changes in the shares of both manufacturing employment and manufacturing value added in 2007 and compare them with the situation in 1990, we find a variety of patterns ( Figure 4 ).
Interestingly, in Luxembourg, the UK and Spain, losses in the share of manufacturing employment were smaller than the decline in manufacturing value added. In Belgium, France and Italy, and somewhat less in the US, the reduction in manufacturing employment and in value added were of similar magnitudes. In the Netherlands, Ireland, Germany, Denmark, Austria, Sweden and Finland, huge falls in manufacturing employment were not accompanied by as pronounced changes in value added, which were much more modest. Finland was the only country that, over the considered period, experienced an increase in the share of manufacturing value added simultaneously with a decline in manufacturing employment (see Figure 4 ). 5 (see Figure 5 ). It is interesting to note that the changes in manufacturing value added were not unidirectional in all EU countries. While most countries followed the pattern of declining manufacturing value added over the eighteenyear period, Finland and Ireland initially, during 1990-2000, experienced an increase in manufacturing value added, followed by a decline only after 2000.
5 Countries presented in Figure 4 are only those for which data were available both for employment and value added in the years considered. share in manufacturing value added, followed by Germany, while Italy had the highest share in manufacturing employment, followed again by Germany.
Comparing the EU with the US, we find substantial differences. In the US, in 2007, only 10 percent of the workforce was engaged in manufacturing (as compared to the average for the EU-14 of 14 percent), while the share of manufacturing value added was rather low, close to 13 percent (as compared to the EU-14 average of 16.7 percent).
Changes Within Manufacturing Sectors
It is also important to examine whether cross-country differences in EU In other subsectors, such as wood, paper products and other manufacturing, the employment share has been relatively stable, while in non-metallic minerals it has declined slightly. Therefore, some sectors did register an increase of their relative share over the 1990-2006 period, while only textiles registered a notable fall. low-tech industries such as fuels, basic metals and mineral products; and iv) lowtech manufacturing, including food, textiles, wood and paper products. 
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Source: Authors' elaboration based on OECD (2014a); EU data refer to: Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Spain, and Sweden. Vol. 16 : No. 1 : April 2014 : pp. 5-48 Within the EU, we observe great differences regarding the role of high-tech sectors between the two main manufacturing leaders, namely Germany, where knowledge-based industries have had an increasing importance, and Italy, where the 2000s were characterized by just the opposite trend (see Figure 10 ). Note also that in France the value added share in manufacturing of high-tech sectors is increasing over the whole period and is approaching the values recorded in the US and the UK. Regarding medium high-tech sectors (see Figure 11 ), there are striking differences between Germany and Italy in two key sectors, namely chemicals and transport equipment, since the two countries have registered opposite trends. in the production of capital goods, pharmaceutical and consumer durables in which it traditionally enjoyed a comparative advantage (Bonatti and Fracasso, 2013 ; see also Coricelli and Wörgötter, 2012) . On the contrary, in Italy the shares of value added of chemicals and transport equipment have been relatively stable or declining; only in machinery and equipment has the value added share slightly increased. 
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Internationalisation of Manufacturing
The growing orientation of manufacturing production towards foreign markets is a widespread phenomenon in the EU and the US from the 1990s onwards, as evidenced by increasing shares of manufacturing exports (see Figure 13 ). These trends confirm that the growth of international trade has been faster than that recorded in manufacturing production. For some countries, however, such as Belgium and the Netherlands, the high values are mainly caused by re-exports of imported goods (Pilat et al. 2006 ).
6
The trend in internationalization of manufacturing is extremely variable among the EU member states and with respect to the US (see Figure 14) . had a comparative advantage in food, wood and paper products, chemicals, basic metals and machinery (see Figure 15 ). The US also shows a comparative advantage in wood and paper products, similar to the EU-15, a weak specialization in chemicals and non-metalic mineral products, but a stronger specialization in transport equipment. China has clearly become strongly specialized in textiles and electric and optical equipment.
Changes in specialization over the 2005-2009 period for the EU-15 should also be considered (see Figure 16 ; values above/below the x-axis reveal specialization/ de-specialization). Source: Authors' elaboration based on OECD (2014b). 
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On the contrary, in medium-high-tech sectors, the supremacy of Germany is confirmed by its higher and increasing market share in global trade during the 2000-2007 period, whereas the US has registered a declining share (see Figure   18 ). Interestingly, the UK, Italy, Belgium and France have export market shares of medium-high-tech manufacturing which are less than half of German's share. We also considered manufacturing export market shares classified into six broad categories (see Figure 19 ). The EU-15 during 2000-2008 has increased its export market shares in high, medium-high, low and particularly high and mediumhigh-tech sectors; these gains have been offset by losses in medium-low and ICTtech manufacturing sectors. Summing up, the decline in the shares of manufacturing employment and value added has occurred in a context of increasing globalization, that has led to boosts in export intensity, with manufacturing trade growing more rapidly than production. However, not all countries have benefited equally from this trend. Germany is undoubtedly one of the winners, given that it has increased its manufacturing export share and has narrowed the gap with respect to the US, that over the same period experienced just the contrary (a loss of its export market share). In high-tech sectors, however, Germany's catching-up process is far from complete. On the whole, EU-15 manufacturing export shares have remained stable, whereas G-7 and the OECD countries, on average, appear to be losers (see OECD, 2014a).
The EU-15, on average, maintains a comparative advantage in food, wood and paper products, chemicals, and to a lesser extent in production of capital goods.
Furthermore, a reduction of medium-low and ICT export shares has taken place, and this has been offset by increases of high and medium-high sectors.
In particular, Germany has gained a higher world share in medium-high-tech sectors: chemicals, machinery and equipment, and production of vehicles. In
Italy, on the contrary, specialization processes in these sectors were generally more fragile. Italy's export performance reveals disappointing results, as is The analysis therefore confirms the leading role in manufacturing of the US and Germany, but in different areas -in the production of high-tech, and medium-high-tech sectors, respectively. Furthermore, the comparison of the two traditionally major manufacturing economies, Germany and Italy, suggests an increasing polarization of EU countries between core and pheripheral economies.
As mentioned initially, our analysis covers only the pre-crisis period (until 2008) .
It ought to be noted, however, that the global crisis has had a very different impact on the manufacturing sector of individual EU members. There is a lot of diversity among countries and not all of them were able to recover quickly. 
The Fundamental Role of Manufacturing Industry in the Western Balkans
The ongoing analysis of trends in the EU is extremely relevant for the WB countries, not only because these countries are aspiring to join the EU. Uvalic, 2012) . While the third factor is common to both the WB and CEEB countries, the WBs missed the opportunity to draw lessons from the CEEB experience accumulated a decade earlier, thus ignoring the "postWashington consensus" formulated in the second half of the 1990s (Kolodko and Nuti, 1997) .
It was expected that after years of isolation and stagnant or declining trade in the WB region, the acceleration of economic reforms after 2001 would ensure export-led growth, but this objective has not been effectively attained. Unsatisfactory export performance derives primarily from supply-side factors and structural problems of the WB economies (Uvalic, 2013b) . Three characteristics of the WB economies must be stressed in this regard: (1) the extreme process of deindustrialization since the early 1990s; (2) the inadequate volume and structure of FDI; and (3) structural changes in favor of fast growth of primarily non-tradable services. 
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If we look at more recent data on specifically manufacturing industry (thus excluding mining, construction, and electricity, gas and water supply), (Uvalic, 2010) . FDI has not only arrived much later to the WBs than to the CEEB region but has had different characteristics (see Estrin and Uvalic, 2013) . FDI was a key driver of economic growth in the CEEB countries, but in the WBs the composition of FDI has often not favored industrial restructuring. Manufacturing as the main sector for developing export potential was significant in the CEEB countries, but much less so in the WBs (see Becker et al., 2010) . In CEEB many industries have been modernized thanks to investments by multinationals from Western Europe, while in the Balkans this has happened much less frequently (see Kalotay, 2010) .
The dominant part of FDI in the WBs has been in services, including banking, Industrial Development in the EU: What Lessons for the Future Member States? Croatian Economic Survey : Vol. 16 : No. 1 : April 2014 : pp. 5-48 telecommunication, wholesale and retail trade and real estate, while relatively little has been invested in manufacturing industry (see Estrin and Uvalic, 2013) .
Due to such a structure of FDI, the Balkan countries have not been successful in integrating into global supply chains (Handjiski et al., 2010: 16) . to support small and medium-sized enterprises, services for the creation of enterprise networks and technology parks, and cooperation between research institutions and industry (Bianchi and Labory, 2009 2012) . This type of industrial policy is also at the basis of the EU's most recent initative aimed at increasing EU competitiveness through "knowledge-driven reindustrialization" (European Commission, 2013) .
Within the broader discussions on the New Growth Model for Eastern Europe (see Nuti, 2009; Becker et al., 2010; Berglof, 2010) , the model in the WB countries, in particular, is being reconsidered, since these countries have generally made less progress than the CEEB countries. It is interesting to note that the EU pro-competition industrial policies were adopted in almost all WB countries in The WB governments could draw on the EU experience to devise industrial policies that would be more efficient in sustaining industrial development, in the function of export-led growth and a faster process of catching-up. Being at one third of the EU-27 average level of development, the WB countries will probably be constrained, in most cases, to imitate the more developed countries, rather than to innovate. A concrete strategy could be to follow Lin and Monga's Sarajevo (see http://www.rcc.int), which suggests that these regional objectives will be carried further.
Concluding Remarks
In the aftermath of the global financial and economic crisis, industrial development has emerged as one of the key issues in the current debate on how to strengthen competitiveness of the EU. In reference to Eastern Europe, the discussions have focused on the New Growth Model. For the WB countries in particular, the policies applied so far ought to be reconsidered, since these countries have generally made less progress than the CEEB countries. However, measures that have been proposed for achieving faster economic development and raising competitiveness of the WB economies will probably not be sufficient without deeper industrial restructuring and modernization. The rich experience in industrial development in the EU member states could prove useful to the WBs.
The evolution and changes in the role of manufacturing industry in the EU clearly illustrate the main patterns of structural changes that have been similar across countries. However, there has also been an increasing differentiation among countries and these changes have not been unidirectional. The WB countries could draw on the experience of the more advanced EU members that have maintained a solid manufacturing base, in order to devise industrial policies and patterns of specialization that could strengthen their own manufacturing
